

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WVIN 700207



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 7 February 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1970

weekly average
for each month





OCTOBER 1969 - FEBRUARY 1970



weekly data as reported, Dec-Jan-Feb
weekly average per month, Oct-Nov





increased this week to 100 from last week's 70.





decreased sharply to 176 from last week's 264. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN for these periods.





stand at one battalion-size group with a strength of 681, and two small QL groups. The large group had previously been accepted as a "gap fill" and thus does not significantly affect the total pipeline input since 23 October -- 34,000 to 35,000



decreased to 726 from last week's 989. This lower level reflected the Tet Ceasefire but was still considerably higher than the pattern of the past few months.



increased to 2,105 this week from the 2,029 of the previous week.



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces decreased to 46% this week from last week's 48%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The week passed without significant enemy activity. Enemy violations of the allied Tet stand down were well below those noted during the same period last year. Allied military casualties were significantly lower than during Tet 1969, but the number of civilian deaths increased this year. Most enemy contacts resulted when allied reconnaissance and security patrols encountered small enemy units on the move. Over the weekend, several very large caches were discovered north of Saigon. Their loss should help upset Communist timing for planned attacks in that area.

25X1C

All sources continue to indicate that the enemy intends to increase his activity, with 10 February the most often mentioned date for the beginning of renewed attacks. [REDACTED] the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) has issued instructions that the Spring Offensive is to begin on 10 February and continue through 20 February. The upsurge, if it occurs, will probably be of a "high point" nature against allied outposts, GVN administrative centers, and the Pacification Program following the pattern of the past year. Imminent attacks are expected in the northern portion of the country, on the northern fringes of III Corps, and in the Mekong Delta. Terrorists and sappers will probably attempt to be active in and around Saigon.

Enemy Infiltration

Following the surge observed in mid-January, infiltration again appeared to decline. Only one new battalion-size group was detected in the pipeline this week. The apparent low level of current infiltration must be considered as tentative, at least for the present. The measuring of infiltration input on a weekly basis tends to be less precise in depicting current trends than the other weekly indicators because of the limitations of our detection system. This week's group with a strength of 681 was detected in Laos, but had already been included in the estimate as a "gap" group, hence its positive detection does not greatly affect the overall infiltration picture. No battalion-size groups have been detected in North Vietnam since 25 January. [REDACTED] probably composed of specialists, were also detected in Laos this week. 25X1B

Since 23 October, the total infiltration pipeline input estimate stands at 34,000 to 35,000 personnel in 71 groups. Of the total number of groups accepted by the community, 42 were detected in NVN, 22 in Laos, and seven are "gap fills."

South Vietnam Developments

President Thieu is apparently planning to have a military court try Tran Ngoc Chau and Hoang Ho, two Lower House deputies whom Thieu considers guilty of complicity in North Vietnamese intelligence activities. Under the constitution, only military courts can try subversion cases of this nature but the constitution also provides legislators with immunity from such action that can only be lifted by a three fourth's vote of their (in this case) Lower House colleagues. On 4 February, after three fourths of the members of the Lower House had signed GVN-sponsored petitions calling for the lifting of these two deputies' immunity, Thieu ordered the military court to proceed with the case against them. [REDACTED] Chau and Ho will be invited to attend the proceedings and defend themselves. If they fail to appear (as the GVN anticipates), they will be tried in absentia. If -- or when -- the court finds these two deputies guilty, the GVN plans to ask the Lower House to go through the formal process of lifting these two "convicted traitors" immunity so they may be legally arrested and the court's sentences carried out. The legality of this whole procedure is debatable, since the constitution is vague on the permissibility of proceeding to trial before a formal resolution of the immunity question. One opposition group has already asked the Supreme Court to rule on this matter.

25X1C

The GVN's action is certain to generate static in Vietnam and abroad. Chau, Thieu's principal target, is an articulate and skillful politician. Articles favorable to him (and hostile to Thieu) have already appeared in the U.S. press and questions about this affair have already been raised in Congress. Thieu, however, clearly regards Chau as a traitor because of the latter's association with his brother, a captured and confessed officer of the North Vietnamese intelligence service. At this writing, Thieu seems intent on proceeding against Chau (and Ho), probably because he now feels his personal prestige, and his campaign against what he considers divisive "third force" elements, would suffer if he were to relent. Another element complicating the problem is the fact that some of Thieu's close advisors (e.g., General Quang) have long standing scores to settle with Chau, dating from his days as a military officer, province chief, and RD Ministry official. Though able, Chau has always been prickly and contentious.

Communist Developments

A recent Viet Cong broadcast suggests that the Communists in South Vietnam view present trends in the war as unfavorable and see the balance of power in the South as now tilted against them. Basically a pep talk for hard-pressed party cadre, the broadcast depicted the task in 1970 as "very heavy" and the road ahead as containing "a number of difficulties and . . . many hardships," although "full of fine prospects." It acknowledged that Vietnamization and pacification have caused "certain difficulties in a number of areas," but asserted that Vietnamization cannot succeed because of fundamental weaknesses in the South Vietnamese Army and that, in the long run, the Communists will prevail. In discussing future action, the broadcast repeatedly emphasized the need to gain time and prepare for the long haul. It does not seem to foreshadow a concerted Communist challenge to Vietnamization in the near future, but rather suggests an attempt to ride out further U.S. troop withdrawals, consolidate and strengthen the Communist forces and keep the pressure on allied forces, particularly the pacification effort.

Other Major Developments

Two Comint developments suggest that Hanoi may again be seriously interested in the possibility of infiltrating supplies (or, possibly, personnel) into South Vietnam by sea. Communications probably serving North Vietnamese Naval Maritime Infiltration Group 125 have recently been re-identified. Group 125 is believed to control the sea infiltration of war related cargo. When Group 125 was last observed in Signal intelligence (in July 1966), it was composed of a control station at Bai Chay in North Vietnam and 24 vessels. The newly isolated and currently active communications net consists of a control station at Bai Chay and 26 vessels, which have been detected operating in the northern Gulf of Tonkin and, on occasion, off the coast of South Vietnam.

In addition, a previously unidentified communications complex, active since August 1966, has been identified as related to maritime infiltration. It is controlled in NVN and has special activity units in SVN which provide information to NVN concerning allied activities in the coastal provinces so that effective control can be maintained over vessels attempting to infiltrate war materiel into SVN.

Although no association between Group 125 and the newly identified complex noted above is yet evident; the complex's existence, the re-identification of Group 125, and the sighting of three steel-hulled infiltration trawlers off the coast of SVN this fall suggest that Hanoi is at least reconsidering the feasibility of seaborne infiltration.

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